There are times when I read quotes from those involved in the current occupation of Iraq, and I say to myself, "Gee, that sounds alot like the old British Empire!"
Case in point:
"I don't think they [the residents of Fallujah] will wake up one day and say, 'I'm all for transparency and the rights of man,'" says [Capt. William] Grube. "We have to show by example that you can be powerful, but not a brutal conqueror."
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Now, Captain Grube cannot be held responsible for stating official U.S. military policy, but his words are at least an indicator of prevailing attitudes. And these attitudes are certainly different from many of the Administration's proclomations, such as, "As they stand up, we will stand down," and the notion of "spreading freedom and democracy in the Middle East," and "liberating Iraq."
More of Capt. Grube's comments in this excellent Christian Science Monitor article further highlight how the military "reality on the ground" is quite different from the Administration's public rhetoric, at least in Fallujah.
For example, the article notes that, "Since the offensive the city has been ringed with a half-dozen checkpoints, open only to residents with special identity cards. Americans have controlled variables here, like nowhere else in Iraq." These measures in Iraq are part of Operation Steel Curtain, which began on November 5.
Operation Steel Curtain (which, I assume, was not named intentionally to remind people of the Iron Curtain, but it does anyway) marks a new strategy in Iraq that seems counterintuitive to the notion of "standing down as Iraqis stand up." It relies on setting up temporary bases in cities and towns such as Husayba, Karabila, and Obeidi after U.S. forces take the towns from militants.
The CSM also notes, "The Pentagon is planning to issue a directive that will codify that strategy, by turning 'what it calls 'stability operations' into a core military mission comparable to full-scale combat,' The New York Times reported Sunday."
This "go and stay" strategy also includes clearing each city of insurgents. Captain Grube states in the CSM article, "'Once you take a city, you've got to go through it slowly and clear it,' says Capt. William Grube, commander of Fox Company, of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, whose unit lives in and helps patrol the city. He says previous operations in Anbar Province, where US and Iraqi forces attacked and then withdrew, were simply 'playing whack-a-mole.'" Logically, though, such a strategy will lead to higher U.S. casualties, as our troops go house to house, block by block, hunting insurgents, raising the risks, as they do not know what may be behind each door, around every corner. On each street, the risk will be high of sniper fire, or booby trapped buildings.
The new policy also marks a complete reversal for the military. Back in May 2004, they had handed over Fallujah to what they dubbed the 1st Batallion of the Fallujah Brigade. The move was heralded by Lt. Gen. James Conway, the top Marine officer in Iraq, as the "formation of a military partnership" that could bring a "lasting, durable climate of peace." But another Marine lamented, "If this fails, they're going to have to go right back in there."
And he was right. The experiment was a failure.
Now, the military is maintaining a more permanent presence in these dangerous cities. While such a military presence by "powerful, but not...brutal" conquerors will improve day-to-day security, I fail to see how this will help in the long term, unless we intend to stay forever.
From the CSM article:
"Fallujah, from day one [of the US attack] to now, is like a big prison - you have a time limit to get out, and to get in, and a [curfew] time you must sleep," says Sheikh Ahmed Sarhan Abd, deputy head of the Fallujah Sheikhs Council. "This emergency situation was supposed to last three or four months, not one year."
"We have not really seen happiness during the Eid [religious celebration]," says Sheikh Ahmed, who blames Iraqi police and army, as well as US forces. "If we want to go to the mosque, Iraqi forces stand at the doorway with guns. Yes, there are insurgents, but you can't put students and our sons in the same basket."
So, what do we do? Personally, I think this Fallujah example helps to make Rep. Murtha's point: that the continuing presence of U.S. troops in Iraqi cities is only making things worse there. When we ended the Fallujah assault, and handed over the city to Iraqi forces, insurgents were able to point to that as a "defeat" for the United States, and drum up further support. Now, as we act even more like an occupying force in insurgent hot spots, the insurgency can also point to our increased and continuing presence, and use it as propoganda for recruitment.
The answers are not clear as to how we should proceed. This is a difficult quagmire that this country was lead into, but if this "flip flopping" of a military strategy is the best we can do in Iraq, then it is time to seriously consider withdrawing.
The British eventually found that their continuing presence in other countries was untenable. We should let history be our guide, and avoid the pitfalls of empire.